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I. INTRODUCTION
The growth of mass media tends to make the world seem like
a relatively small global community. As such, it has become in-
creasingly difficult for individuals to remain isolated from events
and people around them. One consequence of this is that people
often lose some of the privacy they once enjoyed. The situation is
analogous to a small town compared to a large city. The smaller
the town, the more everyone knows about everyone else's business.
No one class of individuals suffers more of a loss of privacy than
entertainers and other celebrities such as professional athletes.
Public officials also come under close scrutiny with a resulting loss
of privacy. Public officials, however, do not usually have to worry
about anyone using their names or pictures in a commercial
advertisement.
There are numerous entertainment trade magazines that have
a tendency to reveal matters to the public that celebrities would
rather keep to themselves. Have entertainers lost all of their pri-
vacy rights? If not, what type of protection does the law give celeb-
rities? In fact, there have been hundreds of cases that have dealt
with entertainers' privacy rights. The results have not been overly
successful from the celebrity's point of view. While the privacy
1
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rights of such public figures are important, there are also rights
vested in those people who have disturbed the privacy of the
celebrity.
All individuals retain some degree of a right to privacy. At the
same time, these rights must be balanced with our first amend-
ment rights of free speech and press. It is now evident that an in-
dividual's right to say whatever he wants often overrides, to a sub-
stantial degree, the privacy rights of another individual. This
situation is especially true in cases involving entertainers. Thus, in
a privacy action, the first amendment provides the strongest de-
fense a defendant can maintain.
This paper will attempt to illustrate the various methods of
privacy analysis that take place throughout the United States. Af-
ter a brief explanation of the historical development of privacy
law, the required elements of a privacy claim will be set forward.
The next topic of discussion will focus on the difference between
the right of privacy and the right to publicity. Following these in-
troductions into the law of privacy, there will be a detailed study
of the elements of a privacy law claim. The special problems in-
volving credit disputes will also be examined. A study of the vari-
ous defenses to privacy claims will be discussed last. Throughout
the paper, an attempt to suggest possible reforms in privacy law
will be included.
II. NATURE OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
A. Historical Development
The doctrine that an individual has the "right to be let alone"'
was not developed until the late nineteenth century. The corner-
stone of privacy law development was a Harvard law review article
written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890.2 The arti-
cle stressed the need for an enforceable right of privacy due mainly
to excesses committed by the press.
Although the article apparently influenced the legal scholars of
the time, the first major court case to be decided after the article's
publication rejected the "right" of privacy.' The opinion was
widely criticized and led to the enactment in New York of the na-
tion's first privacy statute. The law prohibited persons to use the
name, portrait, or picture of another for advertising purposes with-
1. T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
2. Warren & Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
3. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 38, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
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out that person's written consent. The act called for the imposition
of criminal and civil penalties.'
Courts throughout the country also began to recognize a com-
mon law right of privacy. In Pavesich v. New England Life Insur-
ance Co.,' the court held that a distinct right of privacy existed.
Today, all states except Minnesota recognize a right of privacy, ei-
ther by statute or the common law.'
The right has been characterized as the "right to be let
alone." The right of privacy exists to compensate the mental dis-
tress caused by the disclosure of private facts, even though the dis-
closure may be true.
Two distinct interests appear to be protected under the general
rubric of a 'right to privacy.' The first protects that right in its
more conventional sense, and permits a private individual to re-
cover damages for injured feelings and general embarrassment if
... he is unjustifiably subjected to the harsh... and unwelcome
glare of publicity. The second - almost obverse of the first -
protects public figures from having the publicity value of their
names and reputations unlawfully appropriated by others.'
A corporation does not have a right of privacy.
Four types of protected privacy rights arise from these two
general interests. The first is that of unreasonable intrusion. 10 This
occurs when an individual's solitude or seclusion is disturbed, in-
cluding interference with the person or his private affairs." Eaves-
dropping is an example of such a privacy violation. Some commen-
tators have said that the prevention of unreasonable intrusion is
most deserving of the term "privacy," as it most directly protects
the right to be let alone. 2
A second privacy invasion occurs when there is a public dis-
closure of a private fact." Although individuals may not expect to
keep all events in their lives a secret, the law recognizes that there
4. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987).
5. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
6. Hendry v. Conner, 303 Minn. 317, 226 N.W.2d 921 (1975).
7. COOLEY, supra note 1, at 29.
8. Grant v. Esquire Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 879-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (citations omitted).
9. Shubert v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 Misc. 734, 72 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1947). But c..
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) (A corporation "cannot claim equal-
ity" with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy).
10. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (1984).
11. Id.
12. Davidson & Kunkel, The Developing Methodology for Analyzing Privacy Torts, 6
HASTINGS J. COMM. & ENT. L. 43, 63 (1983).
13. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 10, at 856.
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is a line to be drawn when the event concerning the person is not
deemed to be of "public interest.""' The third privacy invasion rec-
ognizes that an individual has a right not to be put before the pub-
lic in a false light. 5 Courts recognize that it is wrong to say that an
individual endorses something when in fact the individual does not
endorse it. The defendant in such a case has put the plaintiff in a
"false light."
The final and most common privacy invasion is called appro-
priation.' 6 Appropriation occurs when the defendant uses the
plaintiff's name or likeness for the defendant's benefit or advan-
tage. 7 The plaintiff need not be a celebrity in an appropriation
suit, but such is usually the case.
The general principles of privacy law, however, are given spe-
cial limitations when the plaintiff involved is a public figure. It is
clear today that such individuals do not have the same amount of
privacy protection afforded to "private" persons. There are three
reasons for this result. First, the public figures have sought public-
ity and have consented to it. Second, their personalities and affairs
have become "public" and are no longer their private business.
Third, the press has a right to inform the public about those who
have become matters of public interest. 8
As to the third explanation above, "public interest," courts
and legislatures have tried to define when something should be
classified as such. In Ali v. Playgirl,9 the court held that an unau-
thorized use of an individual's picture is not violative of New
York's privacy statute if the use is newsworthy or in connection
with an item of news.20 The "public interest" standard, therefore,
seems to be a standard of newsworthiness.
The question then becomes what is the standard of new-
sworthiness? In Virgil v. Time, Inc.," the Ninth Circuit defined a
newsworthiness standard:
In determining what is a matter of legitimate public interest,
account must be taken of customs and conventions of the com-
munity; and in the last analysis what is proper becomes a matter
of community mores. The line is to be drawn when the publicity
14. Id.
15. Id. at 863,
16. Id. at 851.
17. Id.
18. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 411 (1960).
19. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
20. Id. at 727.
21. 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975).
[Vol, 5:95
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ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is en-
titled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private
lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the
public, with decent standards, would say that he had no
concern.
22
Another major issue is that of damages. If the privacy viola-
tion is one of the first three types - unreasonable intrusion, public
disclosure of a private fact or false light - the damages likely will
be nominal. 23 The theoretical basis for these privacy torts is that
there has been an injury to personal feelings. Most courts have
found such damages to be uncertain at best and have refused to
allow substantial damage awards. 24 However, when the injury re-
sults from an appropriation, the damages will be greater because
celebrities have a monetary value associated with their name, im-
age, or likeness.25 Their "personality" may be worth a large sum of
money.
B. Elements of a Privacy Claim
There are three basic elements necessary to maintain a privacy
claim. 1) The use of one's name, image, or likeness, 2) without con-
sent, 3) for another's benefit, usually a commercial benefit.26
These elements will usually arise in an appropriation case.
The elements can also be used in false light and public disclosure
of private facts cases. The unreasonable intrusion scenario will not
normally trigger this type of privacy claim, unless the "gains" of
such interference are publicized. For example, no one would argue
that it is an unreasonable intrusion when a photographer jumps
over a fence in a celebrity's backyard and takes a picture of the
person in a very unflattering position. The photographer may sell
the picture to a trade magazine. If the picture is published, a num-
ber of privacy rights are violated. Not only is there a possible cause
of action for appropriation and public disclosure of a private fact,
there is also a cause of action for unreasonable intrusion.
22. Id. at 1129.
23. E.g., Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661
(1977).
24. But see Jonap v. Silver, 1 Conn. App. 550, 561, 474 A.2d 800, 807 (1984) (plaintiff
recovered $32,000 in damages for mental distress).
25. See, e.g., Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 (9th
Cir. 1974).
26. T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, ENTERTAINMENT LAW 18-18 & 18-19 (1986).
1988]
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C. Right Of Privacy Distinguished From a Right to Publicity
Courts recognize a cause of action called the right to publicity.
This is the right of an individual to control and profit from the
value of his own identity.2 7 Privacy claims are usually brought to
compensate for the hurt feelings or embarrassment of the plaintiff.
However, this is not usually the case when the privacy claim is
based on an appropriation theory. In this sense, appropriation and
the right to publicity are very similar and hard to distinguish. The
privacy and publicity rights are nevertheless usually held to be
separate.28
The functions of each right are different. The distinctive as-
pect of the right to publicity is that it recognizes the commercial
value of the name or likeness of a public figure and protects his
proprietary interest in the profitability of his public reputation or
"persona."'' 2 Therefore, a publicity action is based upon the de-
fendant's attempt to broadcast or publish that which the per-
former usually gets paid for.30 The Eighth Circuit held that a pro-
fessional baseball star, Orlando Cepeda, had a valuable property
right in his name, image, and photograph which he could sell.3
It is also true, however, that a celebrity may bring a privacy
action for appropriation. In fact, a celebrity may have to bring his
suit as a privacy claim rather than a publicity claim if the "appro-
priated" attribute was one that the celebrity had never commer-
cially exploited himself.32 In most cases, however, celebrities want
to profit from the publicity value of their names, and are not as
concerned with compensation for emotional harm. Private individ-
uals do not really have the same choice between the two theories
because the commercial value of their names and likenesses is min-
imal. For those lacking fame, therefore, a privacy action against
appropriation is adequate.
There are several other differences as well. The right to pub-
licity is transferrable and assignable, unlike the right of privacy.33
Furthermore, most courts hold that the right to publicity survives
27. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
28. Id. But see Stephano v. News Group Publications, 64 N.Y.2d 174, 474 N.E.2d 580,
485 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1984) (right of publicity considered an aspect of the right to privacy).
29. Ali v. Playgirl, 447 F. Supp. 713, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
30. Lerman v. Flynt Distributing Co., 745 F.2d 123, 134 (2d Cir. 1984).
31. Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969).
32. Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 727.
33. Cepeda, 415 F.2d at 1205.
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the death of the individual," whereas the right of privacy does
not. 5 Many courts have confused the two theories. This is not sur-
prising given the theoretical similarities between appropriation and
the right to publicity. In Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,36 Bella Lu-
gosi's property interest in his "persona" terminated upon his
death. The court said that the right of privacy, not publicity, was
at stake. The probable reason for this was that the plaintiffs, rela-
tives of the deceased actor, characterized the action as a privacy
action and not a publicity action. The court felt bound to use an
invasion of privacy analysis.
A more reasoned approach can be seen in Brinkley v.
Casablancas7 Fashion model Christie Brinkley filed an invasion
of privacy suit for the unauthorized publication of posters featur-
ing the plaintiff.38 The court felt that Brinkley should have
brought a publicity action. Nevertheless, the court allowed the case
to continue as a privacy action because the facts and issues were
basically the same for both types of actions. The New York Court
of Appeals has continued to hold that the state's privacy statute
encompasses the right to publicity after the decision in Brinkley.39
While this supports the court's analysis in Brinkley, it also brings
doubt upon the precedential value of previous New York decisions
which found publicity violations but no statutory privacy viola-
tions. 0 Other commentators agree that the appropriation doctrine
does not protect privacy per se, but publicity."'
34. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Martin Luther
King, Jr., Center For Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products, 694 F.2d 674 (11th
Cir. 1983).
35. See, e.g., Flynn v. Higham, 149 Cal. App. 3d 677, 680, 197 Cal. Rptr. 145, 149
(1983). There is no common law action for a violation of a deceased's right of privacy. At
least five states do provide for such a cause of action by statute. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-
208 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 839.1 (West 1983); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (1984);
FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (1972); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104 (1984).
36. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
37. 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1981).
38. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987).
39. Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 183, 474 N.E.2d 580,
584, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220, 224 (1984). See also Note, A Legendary Private Affair, 5 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 315 (1986).
40. See, e.g., Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d
661 (1977).
41. Davidson & Kunkel, supra note 12, at 89.
19881
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III. ELEMENTS OF A PRIVACY ACTION IN DETAIL
A. Use of a Person's Name, Image or Likeness
For an entertainer or celebrity to prevail in a privacy action,
the individual must have been identifiable and the received public-
ity undesirable. 2 Pictures are not required. Representations which
are recognizable as the likeness of the plaintiff are sufficient.4 For
example, in Ali v. Playgirl," Playgirl magazine published a nude
cartoon caricature which, though not directly naming him, was
meant to be a likeness of boxer Muhammad Ali. Privacy actions
also include fictional works where the identity of the plaintiff can
be rationally suspected. 5
There are a growing number of cases that allow a cause of ac-
tion in situations where a look-a-like of a celebrity has been used
to advertise the defendant's product. In Onassis v. Christian Dior-
New York, Inc.," Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis sued a clothing
manufacturer for using an actress that looked like Ms. Onassis in
one of its television commercials. The court noted that even
though the privacy statute was to be strictly construed as to the
"name, portrait or picture" requirement, the use of other "real"
celebrities in the advertisement gave the overall impression that
the Onassis look-a-like was in fact Jacqueline Onassis. 7
A similar case is Allen v. National Video, Inc.,4 where the
court found for the plaintiff, Woody Allen, by applying section 43
of the Lanham (Trademark) Act.49 The Lanham Act prohibits the
use of advertising that creates a likelihood of consumer confusion.
Since the actor in the commercial looked similar to Woody Allen,
the court found that there was a likelihood of consumer confusion.
The court also gave a privacy analysis, stating that a look-a-like
may not actually represent himself to be the person he looks like. 0
The court also stated that the privacy statute did not require an
actual "picture" as long as most persons recognized the picture of
the look-a-like to be that of Allen.5
Although a celebrity's name, image, or likeness is protected,
42. Negri v. Shering Co., 333 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
43. Ali v. Playgirl, 447 F. Supp. 713, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
44. 447 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
45. Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1980).
46. 122 Misc. 2d 603, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1984).
47. 122 Misc. 2d at 610; 427 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
48. 610 F. Supp. 612, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 112 5(a) (1982).
50. Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 623.
51. Id. at 624.
[Vol. 5:95
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his voice is not.52 In Lahr v. Adell Chemical,53 actor Bert Lahr
filed a privacy action to prohibit a cosmetics company from using
Lahr's distinctive style of vocalization. Lahr's voice was being imi-
tated by a voice impersonator in a series of commercials featuring
the voice as belonging to a cartoon duck. The court declined to
extend privacy rights to a person's voice, even though the voice
"identified" the plaintiff as being the speaker. 4
Similarly, an entertainer's mannerisms and style of perform-
ance are generally not protected under privacy laws. In Lombardo
v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc.,55 orchestra conductor Guy
Lombardo was an unsuccessful privacy plaintiff. He brought suit
against a company that produced a car commercial featuring a
man directing an orchestra at a New Year's Eve party. Lombardo
claimed that this was a "trademark" of his. Although the actor in
the commercial did not physically resemble Lombardo, he did use
Lombardo's recognizable mannerisms while conducting the orches-
tra. Lombardo sued for breach of contract, invasion of privacy, and
violation of his right to publicity. In rejecting the privacy claim,
the court said that the New York privacy statute did not include
"personality" and "style of performance," and thus refused to read
those attributes into the "name, portrait or picture" provisions.5
If a celebrity is not directly recognizable in a picture, he may
still have a cause of action if the context around the pictured indi-
vidual would lead a person to believe that the individual was the
plaintiff.57 In Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,58 the
plaintiff, a well known race car driver, sued Reynolds for appropri-
ation of his likeness in a cigarette commercial. The plaintiff him-
self could not be recognized, but his racing car could be recognized,
thus enabling people to infer that the driver was the plaintiff. Mot-
schenbacher's car had such a distinctive look and well-known rac-
ing number that alterations made to "disguise" the car in the com-
mercial failed. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
When use of a celebrity's name is at issue, most jurisdictions
hold that the name used does not have to be the actual name of
the plaintiff. As long as the name is associated with the plaintiff
52. Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962).
53. 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962), vacating 195 F. Supp. 702 (D. Mass. 1961).
54. Lahr, 300 F.2d at 258.
55. 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1977).
56. Id. at 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664 (Lombardo's breach of contract and publicity
claims were not dismissed).
57. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
58. Id.
19881
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and "identifies" him, an action will lie. In Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson
& Son,5" Elroy "Crazylegs" Hirsch, a former professional football
player, sued when the defendant named one of its products
"Crazylegs." The court held that the name was so identified with
the plaintiff that people may take the product's name as an en-
dorsement of the product by Hirsch or think that he was associ-
ated with it. 0
Dean Prosser supports this position by giving an interesting
hypothetical. He contends that it would be ridiculous to believe
that Samuel Clemens would have a cause for action for appropria-
tion and yet that Mark Twain would not. 1 The absurdity is real-
ized when one considers the publicity value of "Samuel Clemens"
compared to that of "Mark Twain." Yet despite the inherent logic
of this approach, a minority of courts require that the name appro-
priated be the plaintiff's actual name. 2 In Geisel v. Poynter Prod-
ucts, Inc.,5 the court ruled that Theodor (Dr.) Seuss Geisel could
not bring an action to prohibit a company from producing "Dr.
Seuss" dolls without his consent because the New York statute did
not protect assumed or trade names.6 4 However, the use of a sur-
name without more is actionable if it identifies the plaintiff.6 5
B. Lack of Consent
For an action to lie in privacy, the use of the name, image or
likeness of the celebrity must be without the celebrity's consent. In
the states that recognize a common law right of privacy, written
consent is not required." Most states that create a statutory right
of privacy require written consent to be given.6 7 Two notable ex-
ceptions are California and Tennessee. 8 Oral consent will not pro-
59. 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979).
60. Id. at 398-99, 280 N.W.2d at 137-38.
61. Prosser, supra note 18, at 404 n.174.
62. See Geisel v. Poynter Products, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Carson v.
Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (court implied that the
phrase "Here's Johnny" on defendant's portable toilets would not violate the privacy stat-
ute because the phrase was neither the name nor likeness of Johnny Carson. The court
found for Carson on a right to publicity theory).
63. 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
64. Id. at 355.
65. Adrian v. Unterman, 281 A.D. 81, 118 N.Y.2d 121 (1952), afj'd, 306 N.Y. 771, 118
N.E.2d 477 (1954) (the plaintiff, a fashion designer, was known only by his last name and
labeled his merchandise as such).
66. See Buzinski v. DoAll Co., 31 Ill. App. 2d 191, 197, 175 N.E.2d 577, 580 (1961).
67. See, e.g, Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1981)
68. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1101-08
[Vol. 5:95
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tect a defendant in such a jurisdiction. It is also wise for a person
who consents to use of the name, image, or likeness, to create an
express contractual provision limiting the ways in which use may
be made."9
It is clear that substantial alteration to what was consented to
will vitiate that consent.70 In Russell v. Marboro Books,71 the court
held that a photograph that had been retouched so as to put the
plaintiff, a model, in a different situation than the one in which she
was actually photographed vitiated her consent to have the photo-
graph published. However, if the alteration is not substantial, the
consent of the plaintiff is not vitiated, even if the result is "exag-
gerated" and "objectionable. '72
In some states an infant cannot disaffirm a parent's consent.73
In Shields v. Gross74 actress/model Brooke Shields sued to disaf-
firm the consent given by her mother to a photographer to publish
certain nude pictures taken of Ms. Shields when she was a young
girl. After a lengthy legal battle, the court said that once a parent
gives consent to another on behalf of a child, such consent cannot
be revoked under New York statutory law by the child, even when
she reaches the age of majority. When a photograph is at issue, the
general rule is that the consent of the person(s) photographed is
necessary and the mere consent of the photograph's owner will not
protect the defendant.75 Not even the agent of the person photo-
graphed has authority to grant permission to publish the
photograph. 6
C. The Defendant Must Have Benefitted From the Invasion
Most jurisdictions hold that the benefit incurred by the use of
a celebrity's name, image, or likeness must be commercial in na-
(Michie 1984).
69. T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, supra note 26, at 18-56.
70. Id. at 18-50.
71. 18 Misc. 2d 166, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1959).
72. Dahl v. Columbia Pictures, 12 Misc. 574, 166 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1957), aff'd, 7 A.D.2d
969, 183 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1959). See also Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, 607 F. Supp. 1341
(N.D. Tex. 1985) (Hustler magazine had the right to publish two young girls' nude pictures
which accompanied a book review of other works in which the girls had consented to be
photographed in the nude).
73. Shields v. Gross, 58 N.Y.2d 338, 345, 448 N.E.2d 108, 111, 461 N.Y.S.2d 254, 257
(1983).
74. 58 N.Y.2d 338, 448 N.E.2d 108, 461 N.Y.S.2d 254, (1983).
75. T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, supra note 26, at 18-58.
76. Wilk v. Andrea Radio Corp., 200 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1960), modified, 13 A.D.2d 745,
216 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1961).
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ture, such as use by a profit-making business venture." Some
courts rule by analogy, however, that the benefit does not have to
be financial in nature, as when a name is falsely added to a
petition.18
In Allen v. National Video, Inc., the court set a standard to
determine commercial use.
[The] use in an advertisement of a [picture] which has no other
purpose than to represent its subject, must give rise to a [pri-
vacy claim], because it raises the obvious implication that its
subject has endorsed or is otherwise involved with the product
being advertised. There is no question that this amounts to an
appropriation of another's likeness for commercial advantage.8 0
When the use is commercial in nature, it must be directly re-
lated to the commercial gain by the defendant.81 An incidental use
of the plaintiff's name, image, or likeness is not enough.8 2 In Gau-
tier v. Pro-Football, Inc.,83 a famous animal trainer performed at a
halftime show of a professional football game. His contract specifi-
cally prohibited the telecast of his act. However, the halftime show
was aired and Gautier sued for invasion of privacy. The court ruled
that there was no appropriation because it was not used for com-
mercial purposes inasmuch as the act was just part of the football
game's "overall spectacle," and thus, its use was incidental to the
commercial gain of the defendant.8 4
D. Appropriation and False Light Causes of Action
Problems arise when a celebrity's name, image or likeness is
used to indicate that the person is somehow involved with the
"product" being exploited. The product may be a motion picture,
literary work, or a simple "everyday" commercial product. This
list, of course, is not all inclusive. In credit disputes, two of Pros-
ser's privacy rights, appropriation and false light, are usually
involved.8 5
False light cases usually occur when a celebrity is given a false
77. See, e.g., Wallace v. Weiss, 82 Misc. 2d 1053, 1054, 372 N.Y.S.2d 416, 420 (1975) (a
student run, non-profit organization not liable because their use was non-commercial).
78. Cf. Schwartz v. Edrington, 133 La. 235, 62 So. 660 (1913).
79. 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
80. Id. at 622.
81. Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952).
82. Shubert v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 Misc. 734, 72 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1947).
83. 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952).
84. Id. at 360, 107 N.E.2d at 488-89.
85. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 10, at 851, 863.
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attribution of authorship or his name is used without consent in a
false endorsement. Appropriation usually occurs when a celebrity's
name, image, or likeness is associated with a product without con-
sent. Although the line between false light and appropriation
seems confusing, Prosser has attempted to distinguish the two
causes of action."a First, he argues that false light is usually defam-
atory whereas appropriation is not.8 7 Second, he points out that a
false light action requires "falsity" but appropriation does not. Fi-
nally, he contends that the defendant is advantaged in an appro-
priation case but not in a false light case.
It seems, however, that there is a growing resistance to false
light actions."8 False light actions are tougher to win compared to
appropriation actions. Indeed, at least as far as celebrity plaintiffs
are concerned, there is usually no need for a separate false light
cause of action. In most instances an appropriation theory will be
adequate to compensate the celebrity-plaintiff. For instance, in one
case the plaintiff's name was included in an advertisement that
listed several of the product's "satisfied customers."8 In fact, the
plaintiff, an attorney, was not at all satisfied with the product and
had previously informed the defendant of his dissatisfaction. 0 He
was therefore put before the public in a false light. 1 At the same
time, however, it cannot be said that the plaintiff was defamed. 2
Furthermore, the false endorsement was also an appropriation of
the plaintiff's name for commercial purposes.93 Thus, the first and
third of Prosser's distinguishing characteristics between false light
and appropriation are not as distinguishing as they would first ap-
pear to be.
Prosser's second distinguishing characteristic is also easily at-
tacked. In Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, " the plaintiff, a well
known football player, sued to have his recognized nickname,
86. Id. at 814.
87. It is clear, however, that the false light need not be defamatory. It is enough that
the false light is offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person. See Williams v. ABC,
Inc., 96 F.R.D. 658 (W.D. Ark. 1983).
88. See, e.g., Strutner v. Dispatch Printing Co., 2 Ohio App. 3d 377, 442 N.E.2d 129
(1982) (plaintiff, whose picture was used in an article about drug use in schools, unable to
maintain a claim because the picture was used to illustrate a non-commercial newsworthy
event).
89. Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equipment Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 291 P.2d 194
(1955).
90. Id. at 91, 291 P.2d at 200.
91. Id. at 87, 291 P.2d at 197.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979).
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"Crazylegs," removed from one of the defendant's products. The
plaintiff did not want people to think that he was associated with
the product." He claimed the defendant's use of his nickname put
him in a false light with regard to the product."6 At the same time,
the use of his name was also an appropriation. The appropriation
was effected without the consent of the plaintiff. Thus, this action
also involved "falsity" in a real sense, because, the defendant com-
pany falsely appropriated Hirsch' nickname.
The previous two cases illustrate that all three of Prosser's
distinguishing characteristics are not truly effective when the pri-
vacy rights of a celebrity are at stake. Therefore, courts should be
reluctant to use false light reasoning when there is also a good ar-
gument that appropriation should be the real issue before the
court. Such judicial restraint would be helpful for celebrities and
would actually protect to some extent what few privacy rights that
remain. Such a conclusion follows from the fact that different stan-
dards are used depending on whether the case is characterized by
the court as a false light case or an appropriation case.
The standard to be applied by the court in a false light case
was set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. A plaintiff must
prove that the defendant acted with knowledge of the publication's
falsity or with a reckless disregard of the truth of the matter pub-
lished." It has been historically difficult for plaintiffs to meet this
burden when the defendant is a media enterprise. In an appropria-
tion case, the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan standard is not ap-
plicable.99 In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,100 the
Supreme Court of the United States held that the commercial use
of one's fame was a recognizable property right that an individual
could keep from being exploited. This is because in many cases,
the person's fame goes to his ability to earn a living as an enter-
tainer. An appropriation case thus appears to be easier to win than
a false light case. An entertainer may enjoy more of a right of pri-
vacy by protecting his or her rights with the appropriation cause of
action. Although the effects of applying one or the other of these
95. Id. at 385, 280 N.W.2d at 132.
96. Id.
97. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
98. Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985).
99. Cf. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
100. Id. at 576. This case represents a classic "right to publicity" action. However, it is
likely that a privacy action based on appropriation would receive the same standard, be-
cause the rights and issues in both types of cases are essentially the same. See also Brinkley
v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
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causes of action may not be drastic, any reprieve from the virtual
total lack of privacy that exists today would be a step in the right
direction.
IV. CREDIT DISPUTES
There are generally five factual situations where problems con-
cerning credit, also known as "billing," arise.'01 They are 1) false
imputation of authorship or affiliation; 2) false endorsement; 3)
commercial tie-ins; 4) where the credit itself is the exploited mer-
chandise; and 5) premiums."0 2
A false imputation of authorship occurs when a celebrity's
name is added to a work implying the celebrity's input into the
work when in fact the celebrity had nothing to do with it. A cause
of action for false imputation of affiliation occurs when a defend-
ant is unjustly enriched by having the celebrity associated with the
product without consent.'0
A false endorsement occurs when an individual's name, image
or likeness is used with a product in such a way that it is inferred
that the individual approves of the product.' °0 The courts have
ruled that such "pretended endorsements" are a violation of one's
right to privacy.'0 5
A commercial tie-in is the use of a celebrity's name, image or
likeness in physical proximity to the defendant's product so as to
attract attention to the product. 0 6 No express endorsement is usu-
ally indicated, but it can easily be implied. Such a violation was at
issue in Grant v. Esquire, Inc. 0 7 Actor Cary Grant sued Esquire
magazine for invasion of privacy when Esquire, without Grant's
consent, superimposed a picture of the actor's head on a picture of
a model's body in a clothing advertisement. The picture of Grant
had been cut from a previous authorized picture of the actor that
had appeared in Esquire some years before. The caption of the ad-
vertisement did not suggest that Grant was endorsing the clothing.
On cross motions for summary judgment, the court ruled that
Grant could prevail if a jury concluded that the picture was used
101. T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, supra note 26, at 18-103 & 18-104.
102. Id.
103. Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979).
104. T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, supra note 26, at 18-106.
105. See, e.g., Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equipment Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82,
87, 291 P.2d 194, 197.
106. T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, supra note 26, at 18-108.
107. 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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for a commercial purpose. 108
There are situations where the credit itself is the merchandise
being exploited. This occurs when the person's name, image, or
likeness represents the very subject matter of the disputed prop-
erty.1"9 An example would be a poster for sale featuring the like-
ness of the celebrity.110
The final credit violation occurs when a celebrity's name, im-
age, or likeness is used in connection with a "premium" without
consent."1 A premium is a special offer or giveaway used by a com-
pany to promote the sale of a product.1 ' In Cepeda v. Swift &
Co.,' " the court ruled that by granting Wilson Sporting Goods
Company the "exclusive right" to make baseballs with the plain-
tiff's name on them and "to license others to do so" without any
specific restrictions upon the right, Orlando Cepeda was therefore
foreclosed from asserting that Swift & Company could not use the
baseballs to promote its meat products. Swift had legally obtained
the right to do so through Wilson.' Cepeda stands for the pro-
position that if a celebrity wishes to restrict his consent, he had
better say so specifically - in writing.
V. DEFENSES To PRIVACY AcTIONS
Although celebrities seem to have several ways to protect their
privacy rights, their suits are not always successful. There are sev-
eral defenses a violator may use to shield himself from liability: the
first amendment, truthful credit attribution, and incidental use.
A. First Amendment
The courts have held that when a person's name, image, or
likeness has been used with a matter which has been given first
amendment protection, the privacy claim will not be used to con-
strict the free flow of ideas." 5 Matters subject to first amendment
protection include items that are informative and educational, cur-
108. Id. at 881.
109. T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, supra note 26, at 18-108.
110. Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981)
(Model Christie Brinkley won her suit where the defendant had distributed posters of the
model without her consent).
111. T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, supra note 26, at 18-109 & 18-110.
112. Id.
113. 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969).
114. Id.
115. Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401, 404 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (the first amendment transcends the right of privacy).
[Vol. 5:95
16
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 6
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol5/iss1/6
CELEBRITIES' PRIVACY RIGHTS
rent news, and articles of public interest, including those that con-
vey information about public figures.11
Therefore, a publication's defense in a false light action is
analogous to that in libel law.117 The plaintiff must show actual
malice if he is to win his privacy suit." 8 This is also true because
most courts have found entertainers and other celebrities to be at
least limited purpose public figures.119 Thus it was held that ac-
tress Ann-Margret did not have a valid privacy claim when High
Society magazine reproduced a movie "still" in which the plaintiff
was semi-nude. The court ruled that the magazine had a right to
publish the photograph as it depicted a public performance by a
public figure. 20 If the medium employed is traditionally protected
by the first amendment, such as a newspaper, then the particular
format conveying the information for which the plaintiff seeks
damages is also exempt from liability. Cartoons, comic books and
gossip columns are examples of such protected formats. 2'
If the medium used to convey the information is a commercial
product and not one that has traditionally enjoyed first amend-
ment protection, then a privacy action will probably succeed. For
instance, board games have been held not to be protected. 22 Thus,
newsworthy articles may disclose a professional athlete's statistics
without compensation to the athlete, but other types of commer-
cial products may not. In Stephano v. News Group Publications,'"
the court held that it is the content of a published article and not
the defendant's motive to increase circulation that determines if
the article is newsworthy, as opposed to the trade usage. In
Stephano, the plaintiff, a model, sued when his picture appeared
116. Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 194 F.2d 6, 12 (10th Cir. 1952).
117. Lerman v. Flynt Distributing Co., 745 F.2d 123, 137-38 (2d Cir. 1984).
118. Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, 769 F.2d 1128, 1140 (7th Cir. 1985). Cf. Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988) (emotional distress claim arising from published
parody also must meet the standard established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964). See supra note 97 and accompanying text.)
119. See, e.g., Ann-Margret, 498 F. Supp. at 404 (actress Ann-Margret ruled a public
figure); Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1141 (entertainers can be public figures for first amendment
purposes); and Lerman, 745 F.2d at 132 (author Jackie Collins Lerman held to be a limited
purpose public figure for purposes of sexual discussions).
120. Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
121. Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers, Inc., 277 A.D. 166, 171, 98 N.Y.S.2d 119, 122
(N.Y. App. Div. 1950) (publisher had the right to portray plaintiff's heroic deeds in a comic
book).
122. See, e.g., Uhlaender v. Henrickson, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970); Palmer v.
Schonhon Enterprises, 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (1967).
123. 64 N.Y.2d 174, 185, 474 N.E.2d 580, 585, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220, 225 (1984).
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in an article on men's fashions. Because prices were listed along
with locations where the clothes could be purchased, the model ar-
gued that the article was only an advertisement. 2 ' However, the
court ruled that the article was a matter of legitimate public inter-
est concerning the latest fashion trends.'25
If the plaintiff-celebrity is no longer a current subject in the
public's eye, the defendant may have first amendment protection if
the plaintiff is still a subject of public interest. 126 In Sidis v. F.R.
Publishing Corp.,27 the plaintiff, a once famous child prodigy who
later went into seclusion, sued the New Yorker when it published a
biography of him. The court held that Mr. Sidis was still a subject
of public interest and that the New Yorker had a first amendment
right to print his life's story.128
There are four requirements necessary to invoke a first
amendment defense in a privacy suit.129 First, the presentation us-
ing the person's name, image, or likeness must be subject to first
amendment protection, such as articles that are newsworthy.
30
The second requirement is that the relationship between the un-
derlying presentation and the use of the person's name, image, or
likeness may not place the person in a false light. The usage must
also be representative or illustrative of the subject matter of the
presentation. In Metzger v. Dell Publishing Co.,' 3' the court held
that the publishers of Front Page Detective did not have the right
to use the young plaintiffs picture in a story entitled "Gang Boy"
when there was no evidence that the boy was indeed involved in
gang activity. The court noted that while the story was of legiti-
mate public interest, the publishers did not have the right to drag
the plaintiff into the discussion.'
The court in Arrington v. New York Times Co.'33 held that
the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's picture in an article about
the black middle class was permissible because the article was
124. Id. at 185-86, 474 N.E.2d at 585, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 275-76.
125. Id.
126. Sidis v. F.R. Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
711 (1940).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, supra note 26, at 18-78 & 18-79.
130. Stephano v. News Group Publications, 64 N.Y.2d 174, 474 N.E.2d 580, 485 N.Y.S.
220 (1984).
131. 207 Misc. 182, 136 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1955).
132. 207 Misc. at 185, 136 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
133. 55 N.Y.2d 433, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 449 N.Y.S.2d 941, reh'g denied, 57 N.Y.2d 669,
439 N.E.2d 884, 454 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983).
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about a matter of public interest and the plaintiff was indeed a
member of the black middle class. Therefore, his picture was illus-
trative of the article. However, the court only extended the privi-
lege to the newspaper and not to the free lance photographer who
took the picture or the photographic agency which sold the picture
to the Times."'
The third requirement is that the underlying presentation
must not be falsified. Thus, a fictionalized account of an actual his-
torical event does not merit "privileged" use in a privacy suit.'3 5
However, if the publisher has made clear that the work is fictional,
he may escape liability. 36 Thus, millionaire Howard Hughes was
held to have no cause of action for an admittedly fictional
"autobiography."1 37
Minor errors of historical fact do not amount to a falsification.
When actress Janet Leigh wrote an article on her life for the trade
magazine Motion Picture, she set the date of her marriage back
one year as well as her own age.1 8' Her ex-husband sued for an
invasion of privacy claiming, among other things, that the story
had been falsified. The court held that such errors were unsubstan-
tial and were made by the actress to emphasize how very young
she was when she was first married. 3 9
It is also very clear today that substantial errors which falsify
the presentation may also be defended if the errors were not made
knowingly or with reckless disregard of the truth, and if the sub-
ject concerns a public figure or a matter of public interest. 4 ' In
Time, Inc. v. Hill,"' the plaintiff sued Life magazine when it re-
ported on a play concerning a hostage incident in which the plain-
tiff was involved. The plaintiff claimed that the play had been fic-
tionalized from the actual events. Indeed, it had been. However,
the Supreme Court held that the public's interest in the story was
strong, and that the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan standard.. 2
134. 55 N.Y.2d at 443, 434 N.E.2d at 1323-24, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
135. E.g., Youssoupoff v. CBS, 19 A.D.2d 865, 866, 244 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (N.Y. App. Div.
1963) (Steuer, J., concurring)(fictionalized play about the killing of Rasputin was not im-
mune in privacy action as "informative" matter).
136. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 85 Misc. 2d 583, 587, 380
N.Y.S.2d 839, 844 (1975).
137. Id.
138. Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 733, 20 Cal. Rptr. 405
(1962).
139. Id. at 738, 748, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 410, 420.
140. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
141. Id.
142. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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of actual malice was the appropriate standard to apply in such
cases. However, courts have held that the actual malice defense is
not available when the person's name, image, or likeness is used in
a completely exploitative, commercial manner." 3 Thus, when the
presentation is not really made for "news" purposes, liability may
attach."'
The final requirement necessary to invoke a successful first
amendment defense is that the presentation may not constitute an
advertisement in disguise. In Reilly v. Rapperswill Corp.,"5 a com-
mercial for the defendant's products used a part of the plaintiff's
newscast that featured the defendant. The court found a selfish,
commercial exploitation of the newscast by the defendant and re-
fused to extend to the defendant a privileged first amendment use
of the newscast.1 6
B. Truth
When a person has given another the right to use their work,
the person using the work has the right to tell the public that the
author or artist is the creator or is otherwise associated with the
work. In Shaw v. Time-Life Records" 7 the court held that Time-
Life had the right to say in a commercial for "Swing Era" records
that Artie Shaw arrangements were included, as the arrangements
had been previously placed in the public domain."6
C. Incidental Use
There are two types of incidental use defenses. The first is
called de minimis use. This defense is available when the use of a
person's name, image, or likeness is sufficiently inconsequential. In
Delan v. CBS, Inc.,"' the court held that a four second appearance
of the plaintiff, a mental patient, and the use of the plaintiff's first
name in a sixty minute television documentary about the deinsti-
tutionalization of mental patients was too fleeting and incidental
143. T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, supra note 26, at 18-93.
144. See. e.g., Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 425, 198 Cal. Rptr.
342, 352 (1983) (actor Clint Eastwood won a privacy suit against the National Enquirer
magazine when it published a fabricated story about a "love triangle" between Eastwood,
the actress Sondra Locke, and country music singer Tanya Tucker).
145. 50 A.D.2d 342, 344, 377 N.Y.S.2d 488, 491 (1975).
146. Id. at 345, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
147. 38 N.Y.2d 201, 341 N.E.2d 817, 379 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1975).
148. Id. at 205, 341 N.E.2d at 820, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
149. 91 A.D.2d 255, 260, 458 N.Y.S.2d 608, 614 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
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to be actionable.1 50
The second incidental use defense arises when the person's
name, image, or likeness is used to illustrate and advertise the
quality and content of a traditionally protected first amendment
presentation. Such use is considered incidental to the dissemina-
tion of the information in the presentation which is itself privi-
leged. In Namath v. Sports Illustrated,5 football star Joe
Namath sued Sports Illustrated when it used his picture in con-
junction with a subscription campaign. The photos had previously
been used by the magazine in the coverage of sporting events. The
court held that there is no privacy violation if the use of one's
name and photo are limited to establishing the news content and
quality of the media which uses the name and photograph.1 52
VI. CONCLUSION
Privacy law is relatively new when compared to other legal
doctrines. Perhaps this explains why the law of privacy is in such a
state of constant change, and, at times, uncertainty. These laws
may vary greatly from state to state. What one court may call a
privacy violation, another court may call a constitutionally pro-
tected publication.
Out of the confusion there can be seen a need for at least two
changes in the area of privacy law. First, there should be a unifica-
tion of the privacy tort of appropriation and the tort for a violation
of one's right to publicity. The two torts, in fact, do deal with the
same rights and issues and are interchangeable. Yet the results of a
suit may be strikingly different depending on how the action is
characterized. It is time to merge privacy and publicity and create
a new set of rules that will be equally applied in both types of
situations. New York has declared that privacy and publicity are
now one and the same; however, the state must now redefine the
rules so that each action is consistent with the privacy statute. As
the law now stands, many of the common law attributes of the
right to publicity are not yet subsumed by the privacy statute.
This situation needs to be rectified. Once this has been accom-
plished, other states should adopt the New York model.
The second change that should be made is to allow the celeb-
rity-plaintiff to decide whether he wants his case to be character-
150. 91 A.D.2d at 260, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
151. 80 Misc. 2d 531, 363 N.Y.S.2d 276, afl'd, 48 A.D.2d 487, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1975),
aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 877, 352 N.E.2d 584, 386 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1976).
152. Id. at 534, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 278.
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ized as a false light case or an appropriation case. There are, as
mentioned, many instances which can be classified as either false
light or appropriation. Yet, the likelihood of success depends on
what standard the court uses to judge a defendant's action. If the
actual malice standard is used, then the chance of victory for a
celebrity-plaintiff is greatly diminished. This result is not fair to a
celebrity who has already suffered enough of a loss of his privacy
rights.
Individuals deserve a certain amount of privacy, and celebri-
ties are no exception. Steps like the two proposed need to be taken
in order to stop the erosion of privacy rights and give back some
privacy rights that have already been taken away.
L. Lee Byrd*
* To my mother and father, they know what they have done and I thank them.
[Vol. 5:95
22
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 6
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol5/iss1/6
